The Office of Inspector General's List of Excluded Individuals and Entities (LEIE) is the federal registry of providers barred from participating in Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health programs. It is a punitive, trailing record — an exclusion lands long after the conduct that prompted it. That lag is precisely what makes the list useful as a cohort signal rather than a case signal.
Through April 2026, new additions to the LEIE were essentially flat — down 2.4% against the same period in 2025, and down 18.7% across full-year 2024 (3,134 additions) to 2025 (2,549). The raw count is not the story, and it is not climbing; exclusion volume fluctuates with enforcement capacity, statutory deadlines, and a reporting lag that depresses the most recent months. The structure is the story.
Figure withdrawn · 2026-07-14. The monthly series cannot be re-derived from the current production database and is not presented as a current finding. The original values remain recorded in the claim-level audit ledger.
Joining exclusions to enrollment
We linked each new exclusion to its PECOS enrollment record where one existed, then to the cost-report markers we use as a rough proxy for financial distress — negative operating margin across two consecutive cost-report periods, and a current ratio below one. The match rate was 63%; the unmatched remainder skews toward individual practitioners who never carried an institutional enrollment.
Among the matched, institutional exclusions were 2.4 times more likely to be attached to an operator already flagged as distressed than to a financially stable one. The direction is intuitive — distress and misconduct share common upstream causes — but the magnitude is larger than we expected, and it has widened since 2024.
"Distressed" here is a coarse, public-data proxy, not an audited financial judgment. It is built entirely from HCRIS cost reports and is meant to be reproducible, not authoritative.Why the clustering matters
If exclusions were randomly distributed across the provider base, the list would be a poor early-warning instrument — by the time a provider is excluded, the damage is done and the signal is spent. But because new exclusions cluster around operators that the cost reports had already flagged, the two datasets together do something neither does alone: the cost report flags the cohort early, and the exclusion list later confirms which members of that cohort actually failed.
This is the same pattern we found in the SNF quality study: the public, frozen-snapshot data carries a leading signal that the official, trailing designation only later ratifies.
The moat is not any single dataset. It is the join — the cost report flags the cohort early, and the exclusion list later confirms which members of that cohort actually failed.
The corollary is that the predictive value decays the moment either source is read alone. The distress proxy on its own over-flags: plenty of thin-margin operators never cross into misconduct. The exclusion list on its own is too late to act on. Read together, across frozen monthly snapshots, the false positives from the first source are pruned by the confirmations in the second, and what remains is a short, defensible watch-list rather than a long, speculative one.
Methodology
All figures are aggregations over the OIG LEIE snapshot oig-leie/2026-05
(stored under the 2026-05-01 monthly key from the OIG file captured 2026-05-08;
the committed cms-leie-2026-05-08.json contains 83,001 records).
Year and year-to-date trends count new additions by excl_date. The structural
finding joins each new exclusion to its PECOS enrollment by NPI, then to an
HCRIS-derived financial-distress proxy: an operator is "distressed" when it
posts a negative operating margin across two consecutive cost-report periods and
a current ratio below one. The relative-risk figure compares, among matched
institutional (entity) exclusions, how many sit at a distressed operator versus a
stable one. The match rate to PECOS was 63%; the unmatched remainder skews toward
individual practitioners who never carried an institutional enrollment. Every
count resolves to a specific row in a specific frozen snapshot; the exact SQL is
in the reproducibility block below. Methodology version: distress-proxy/v1. The
source-provenance contract is documented in the provenance methodology.
Limitations
- A coarse, public-data distress proxy. "Distressed" is built entirely from HCRIS cost reports and is meant to be reproducible, not authoritative. It is not an audit, credit rating, or solvency opinion, and it over-flags: thin-margin operators frequently never cross into misconduct.
- A trailing record. An exclusion lands long after the conduct that prompted it, and the most recent months are depressed by reporting lag. The study reads the list as a cohort signal, not a real-time one.
- Partial match rate. Only 63% of new exclusions matched a PECOS enrollment; the clustering finding is stated over matched institutional exclusions, not the whole list.
- Aggregate only. Every figure is a count or ratio at the file, year, or institutional/distress-status level. No individual provider is named, ranked, or scored.
- Corrected framing (2026-06-01). The original publication framed exclusions as rising; that figure was not reproducible from the committed snapshot and was corrected to the flat-to-declining series. The append-only corrigendum is in the reproducibility block.
Sources
- HHS-OIG — List of Excluded Individuals and Entities (LEIE) — the federal exclusion registry behind every count in this study.
- CMS — Medicare provider enrollment (PECOS) — the enrollment records joined to each exclusion by NPI.
- CMS HCRIS Hospital Cost Reports — the cost-report source for the financial-distress proxy.
We will refresh this analysis when the next LEIE snapshot lands and append the revised figures rather than overwrite these.
- ACCESS · APR 2026A March spike in Medicare enrollment deactivations thinned provider supply in shortage areasMedicare enrollment deactivations in PECOS ran 28% above the trailing-twelve-month average in March 2026 — and the spike was not uniform. Deactivations in HRSA-designated shortage areas grew 41% against trend, versus 19% elsewhere. The places least able to absorb a departure lost providers fastest.
- FINANCIAL DISTRESS · JUN 2026Hospitals at Risk of Closing? The Days-Cash-on-Hand SignalFederal HCRIS cost reports let us compute days cash on hand for 5,459 hospitals, but facility-level figures are distorted by system-level cash pooling — so the raw '2,800 hospitals under 30 days' headline is mostly noise. The defensible signal is narrower: 690 hospitals that report thin cash and also run an operating loss.
- CARE QUALITY · MAY 2026Why 14% of skilled nursing facilities had a quality drop in Q1Across 5,148 SNFs in Q1 2026, the composite quality score declined by an average of 0.06 points — but the decline was not evenly distributed. Facilities that changed ownership in the prior twelve months accounted for a disproportionate share of the slide.
- CARE QUALITY · JUN 2026Nursing Home Survey Results: How Fast Deficiencies Get FixedAcross 410,723 corrected CMS nursing home health deficiencies, the mean time from survey to documented correction is 32.4 days — but the harm-level citations, Severity G and above, close faster, in 28.5 days. The more severe the finding, the quicker the fix. Texas and Illinois correct in about two weeks; Washington, D.C. takes nine.
- WORKFORCE · JUN 2026Zero-RN days: how often US nursing homes ran a day with no registered nurse on the floorIn the CMS Payroll-Based Journal's 2025 Q2 snapshot, 5.86% of nursing-home facility-days with residents present recorded zero registered-nurse direct-care hours — 77,542 days across 5,062 facilities. The rate ranged from 27.9% in Louisiana to 0.2% in Rhode Island. Days before the federal staffing floor was rescinded, this is the baseline the country now keeps.
Federal source citations
Fonteum LLC · May 5, 2026 · Historical figures are retained for the audit record and are not current findings.